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Abstract
In this article, we ask whether the principles of welfare redistribution have been altered in 
the era of ‘permanent austerity’; when pressures to dismantle (or at least cut down the costs) 
of social welfare institutions due to unfavourable economic and demographic developments 
have been strong. The primary ﬁ  nding from a systematic analysis of disability beneﬁ  t reform 
in the UK, the Netherlands and Finland between 1980 and 2006 is that, regardless of the 
‘irresistible forces’ (Pierson 1998) urging for reforms, the core principles of European 
social security provision have been preserved. Our ﬁ  ndings speak for path dependence of 
institutions, but also call into question the deterministic views on path dependence. It is 
argued in the article that path dependence does not predict that policy-makers are unable 
to alter the systems, rather we claim that it delimits the number of options available for the 
policy makers. 
Key words: comparative research, institutions, path dependence, policy change, welfare 
state
Samenvatting
Dit artikel bestudeert of  de herverdelingsprincipes van de verzorgingsstaat tussen 1980 en 2006 veranderd 
zijn in Nederland, Groot Brittannië en Finland. De primaire bevinding is dat ondanks onweerstaanbare 
krachten (Pierson 1998) die roepen tot hervormingen, de kernprincipes van Europese sociale zekerheid intact 
zijn gebleven. Onze bevindingen duiden op padafhankelijkheid van de sociale instituties, maar werpen ook 
vragen op over de deterministische opvattingen over padafhankelijkheid die te vinden zijn in de literatuur. In 
dit artikel wordt beredeneerd dat padafhankelijkheid niet voorspelt dat de politici weerloos zijn, maar dat het 
de opties van de politici beperkt.
Sleutelwoorden: vergelijkend onderzoek, instituties, padafhankelijkheid, beleidshervorming, verzorgingsstaatPage ● 6
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Welfare reform in the UK, the Netherlands, and Finland
Introduction 1. 
The welfare states emerged as a response to the risks of the industrial economy within the frame-
work of the nation state. In the post-war years, each nation opted for a system of redistribution com-
patible with national value sets and normative views on how fair redistribution should be organised 
in a speciﬁ  c country. These historical and institutional legacies are claimed to be locked into speciﬁ  c 
patterns of developments (or regimes as suggested by Esping-Andersen 1990). The self reinforc-
ing nature of these institutions is claimed to obstruct changes in policy tracks (Pierson 1994). This 
leaves political decision makers with a double stride: on the one hand, they must preserve the welfare 
institutions promoting social wellbeing and social cohesion, but on the other hand, they must ﬁ  ght 
against rising expenditure and budget orthodoxies in a new world of intensiﬁ  ed global competition 
and demographic changes. The objective of this article is to explore whether the traditional principles 
of welfare redistribution (namely, need, reciprocity and universalism) have been altered in the era of 
‘permanent austerity’, when pressures to dismantle (or at least cut down the costs) of social welfare 
institutions due to unfavourable economic and demographic developments have been strong. 
From an analysis of legislated disability beneﬁ  t reforms over 25 years in the UK, the Nether-
lands and Finland, the article suggests that, despite the ‘irresistible forces’ (Pierson, 1998) urging for 
reforms, the core principles of European social security provision have been maintained. In the light 
of academic literature, such observation speaks for path dependence of institutions. However, to say 
that traditional principles have remained unaltered is not to say that nothing has happened. On the 
contrary, the reforms of disability programmes in these three countries have led to a more stringent 
and less accessible programmes, where activation and (higher) degree of disability play an ever in-
creasing role in establishing the eligibility. This observation calls for revisiting the deterministic views 
on path dependence suggesting that path dependence would be somehow in contrast with change. If 
social scientists keep on viewing path dependence as a means of understanding institutional sticki-
ness, they fail to understand the dynamics of change taking place in Europe today. By doing this, they 
thus rule out any adaptation through (partial) renewal of institutional arrangements and modiﬁ  ca-
tion of guiding principles, norms, and ideas (for similar criticism, see also Crouch and Farrell, 2003, 
Thelen, 2003). We plan to remedy this by providing a simple account of how systematic in-depth Page ● 10
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analysis of legislated beneﬁ  t reforms indicates a story of change within the limits of path depend-
ence. It becomes evident from the cases that path dependence does not predict that policy-makers 
are unable to alter the systems, rather that it delimits the repertoire of feasible policy options for the 
policy makers. 
The article is structured as follows. In the ﬁ  rst section, we examine the theoretical discussion of   
principles in the path dependent world of welfare state institutions. Secondly, the empirical assess-
ment consisting of the analysis of legislated beneﬁ  t reforms between 1980 and 2006 is presented. 
Thirdly, the ﬁ  ndings are discussed and conclusions are drawn about welfare state change within the 
limits of path dependence. Page ● 11
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Back to basics: Changing principles  2. 
of social security
The normative foundations of welfare states are embodied in the three classical redistributive 
principles of need, reciprocity and universalism: they institutionalise the national value set and posit 
how distribution of welfare should be organised in a country. The principle of need embeds the idea 
of people being given resources according to their needs, and true need is often (but not always) 
measured with a means-test; the reciprocity principles necessitates (re)-distribution to be provided 
according to individual status, and therefore contributions in some form (insurance contributions, 
work history record etc.) are a prerequisite for eligibility of insurance beneﬁ  ts. Finally, the principle 
of universalism sets out an (often moderate) redistribution of welfare at a ﬂ  at-rate in order to pro-
vide basic security for all people (citizens).1 These core principles also provide a foundation for the 
welfare state typologies. For instance, Esping-Andersen (1990: 3) distinguished between the liberal 
(needs-based), conservative (insurance-based), and social democratic (universal) welfare states which 
owe their origins to different historical forces and follow qualitatively different developmental trajec-
tories. Esping-Andersen suggests that rather than having social spending at the core of political con-
ﬂ  icts, historical actors (most decisively political coalitions) had united and struggled for safeguarding 
certain principles: conservative regimes are loyal to status-distinct social insurances, liberal regimes 
are institutionally wedded to the market, and social democratic regimes strive to build a system that 
beneﬁ  ts both the traditional working class clientele and the new white-collar strata (Esping-Andersen 
1990: 32). In his view ‘politics not only matters, but it is decisive’ (1990: 4) and the power constella-
tions during the formative phase of the welfare state were crucial in shaping the ‘type’ of ‘ideology’ 
of social policy, also affecting their future prospects. Although Esping-Andersen’s typology is often 
subjected to academic debate and criticism (see e.g., Arts and Gelissen 2002), hardly anybody ques-
tions the existence of the three guiding principles of welfare provision embedded in such models or 
typologies.
Another ‘conventional wisdom’ in the social sciences literature posits that changes, and certainly 
cuts to existing institutions and rights, are difﬁ  cult to be justiﬁ  ed by the political decision-makers. Fol-Page ● 12
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lowing the increased returns principles, changes are seen difﬁ  cult because of the vested interests of 
people involved: the more individuals participate in (paying contributions or beneﬁ  ting from) these 
social institutions, the more deeply ingrained its existence becomes. In the light of Esping-Andersen’s 
work, one can assume that policy-makers are bound by past and current institutions, and therefore, 
repertoires of feasible policy options are limited. In his re-examinations of regimes, Esping-An-
dersen (1999: 165) suggests that ‘the inherent logic of the three welfare regimes seems to reproduce 
itself’. Following this argument, students of social sciences often point towards path dependence as 
an explanation of why welfare states are ‘surprisingly resilient’ (Taylor-Gooby, 2002: 597) or why re-
forms often take the form of small adjustments. The recent literature has, however, shown that path 
dependence does not per se mean inertia or frozenness: rather as Streeck and Thelen (2005a) have 
shown a fundamental reform can also occur through an incremental process over a long time period. 
Although path dependence theory undoubtedly needs adaptation to cope with situations where ac-
tors are able to search alternative paths, we choose to retain the central insights of path dependence, 
the idea of continuity of policy ideas (traditional principles underlying the institutions and policy-
making). Truly, (social policy) actors rarely are in a situation in which they can ignore the past, and 
their decisions are bound by the past and the present. However, one must go beyond the determinis-
tic views on path dependence, since in the real world of welfare institutions, institutions must interact 
with exogenous environments in order to survive. Even though initial institutional steps may have a 
strong conditioning effects on later ones (Pierson, 2000), we claim that institutions generate also new 
learning effects. In some cases this may lead to alternative paths of development than the one taken, 
but it may also lead to ‘rediscovering’ of old paths. What follows is an analysis of empirical cases of 
legislated changes implemented between the beginning of the ‘permanent austerity’ (1980) and 2006. 
It is shown how reforms to disability beneﬁ  t schemes have lead to considerably different (less gener-
ous, less comprehensive in coverage, more conditional) schemes in the course of 26 years, but how 
the core principles of social security provision have remained unaltered. Before going into the em-
pirical analysis, a brief glimpse at the case selection is necessary. The cases (the UK, the Netherlands, 
and Finland) are selected so that they each represent one of the traditional re-distributive principles 
(respectively; need, insurance, and universalism) in the structure of their disability provision (see van 
Gerven, 2008 for an extensive discussion of cases and reforms). By doing this, we also knowledge 
the problems rising when placing any country (or even a single scheme) under an ideal-type regime Page ● 13
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or model: within one country many different kinds of institutions can co-exists. For instance, unlike 
in the UK and the Netherlands , where disability beneﬁ  t provision is organised through (workers’) 
insurance programmes, the contingency of long-term work incapacity in Finland is covered through 
the state basic pensions scheme and its’ occupational substitution.2Page ● 14
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Empirical assessment 3. 
 The UK 3.1. 
In order to comprehend the developments of the British National Insurance beneﬁ  t in the last 
decades, one must go as far back as the introduction of the ﬁ  rst National Insurance Act (NIA) of 
1911. The Act was a cornerstone for the British insurance protection by institutionalising insurance 
beneﬁ  ts against sickness and unemployment paid from wage-earnings. These beneﬁ  ts aimed merely 
at minimum protection since they were paid only at a survival level, and to discourage idleness, they 
were paid only for a maximum period of 15 weeks a year. In the seminal Beveridge Report, intro-
duced three decades later, the essence of NI insurances were kept unaltered, but the programmes 
were made more comprehensive in coverage and more generous (though beneﬁ  ts remained payable 
at a ﬂ  at rate minimum level). In 1966, a step towards a more Bismarckian system (providing beneﬁ  ts 
related to past earnings) was taken when the Labour government introduced earnings-related supple-
ments for the NI beneﬁ  ts. 
The ﬁ  rst oil price shock in the mid-1970s, followed by a more severe crisis in the early 1980s, 
strained most economies, the UK included. The UK was commonly regarded as the ‘sick man of Eu-
rope’ due to its low economic growth rates and sharply increasing numbers of unemployed (Clasen, 
2003: 574). Economic growth rates slackened and GDP fell in both 1974 and 1975 causing a rise in 
unemployment, which continued to rise even in the 1980s. For the ﬁ  rst time since the Second World 
War, the number of unemployed rose to above one million and ﬁ  nally peaked in 1976 at 1.5 mil-
lion (Lowe, 1993: 301). The election of 1979 led to a fundamental, although gradual shift in social 
policy. The Conservative government (1979-1990), led by Margaret Thatcher, was explicit about their 
ambition to ‘roll back the frontiers of the state’ and to ‘end the culture of dependency’. The main di-
lemma was perceived to be the level of public expenditure as announced by Geoffrey Howe, the then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer in his ﬁ  rst Budget of May 1979 when he stated that ‘Public expenditure 
is at the heart of the UK’s present economic difﬁ  culties’ (HM Treasury, 1979: 1). Reforms to come 
(most important of which are sketched out in Table 1 below) indeed have turned the clock back in Page ● 16
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time. The logic of Bismarckian insurances has been abandoned, and the current (2006) programmes 
resemble to a large extent the original (Beveridgean) instruments: social insurance programmes pay 
low level ﬂ  at-rate beneﬁ  ts for the insured.
SSA 1980 (c. 2) Abolition of  ERS from sickness beneﬁ  t (SSA 1994 from disability beneﬁ  t)
SSA 1986 (c. 50) Statutory indexation no longer compulsory
SSA 1994 (c.18) Abolishing (or more stringent conditions for) child/spouse/age supplements
WRPA 1999 (c.30) Means-test introduced (for certain pension income)
Table 1. A synthesis of principle-changing reforms in the UK, 1980-2006
This demotion of Bismarckian insurance logic was started by reforms that abolished the earn-
ings-related supplements from National Insurance beneﬁ  ts (to sickness and unemployment beneﬁ  ts 
in 1980 and to disability beneﬁ  ts in 1994). This consequently changed the insurance programmes 
from insurance programmes related to past earnings (Bismarckian) to the ﬂ  at-rated (Beveridgean) 
insurance programmes. At the same time, the privatisation of the (occupational) sickness beneﬁ  t 
(under the SSP, Statutory Sick Pay system) started in the 1980s and ﬁ  nished a decade later, generated 
a dual system where the public sickness beneﬁ  t generated (basic) security for low paid earners and 
the more generous SSP provided an efﬁ  cient income replacement for workers with higher income 
(i.e., for workers with annual earnings above certain amount). Other elements of insurance system 
paying beneﬁ  ts above minimum level were gradually abandoned in the 1980s and 1990s by abolish-
ing most of the supplements for dependants, children or spouses. In the same vein, the system of 
indexation of social security beneﬁ  t rates was altered in the 1980s so that indexation of beneﬁ  t rates 
was no longer obligatory for the Secretary of the State. This meant that short-term beneﬁ  t (sickness, 
unemployment) rates no longer followed the welfare developments of the rest of the population. 
Such measures diluted the insurance principle in these programmes and (indirectly) strengthened the 
purpose of these programmes to provide merely minimum protection. 
In the period 1990-1997, the UK witnessed another stream of considerable revisions in the 
disability programmes. The restructuring was preceded by an extensive growth in both the number Page ● 17
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of claimants and the costs of the beneﬁ  t. In 1978/1979 there were 612,000 recipients claiming dis-
ability beneﬁ  t, but by 1992/1993 this had risen to 1.5 million (Wikeley, 1995: 525). Also the costs of 
this beneﬁ  t had doubled since 1982/1983 (Wikeley et al., 2002: 524). These and other factors led to 
the replacement of (short-term) Sickness Beneﬁ  t and (long-term) Invalidity Beneﬁ  t by a new single 
Incapacity Beneﬁ  t (IB) in 1994 (see e.g. DSS, 1990). In addition to a series of smaller adjustments 
that led to less generous beneﬁ  t entitlements (namely, cuts to supplements paid for IB claimants and 
extension of less generous short-term beneﬁ  t payment duration from 6 months to 1 year), the intro-
duction of IB symbolised a landmark for increasing medical inspection in the UK. Already in 1984, 
some functional tests of disablement had been introduced for claimants, but medical inspection did 
not start to play a more signiﬁ  cant role in assessing beneﬁ  t rights until the introduction of IB in 1994. 
Two new tests were introduced: an Own Occupation Test and an All Work Test. The Own Occupa-
tion Test, carried out by claimants’ own GP, applied for the ﬁ  rst 28 weeks of incapacity for claimants 
(similar to both IB as well as SSP applicants) and it assessed if workers were too ill to work at their 
usual occupation. The second and harder All Work Test tested (in)capabilities at the 28th week of 
sickness. Previously under IVB, the periodical assessment could take into account the claimants’ age 
and qualiﬁ  cations, but the All Work Test under IB deﬁ  ned whether the recipients were capable of 
doing any job at all (regardless of the likelihood of them getting such a job or its suitability). It was 
estimated that over the ﬁ  rst two years after the introduction of the All Work Test some 222,000 ex-
isting recipients would be denied the IB under it, while some 55,000 new claimants, who would have 
qualiﬁ  ed had the old IVB test applied, would be ruled out by it (Bonner, 2005: 30). 
The expenditure on beneﬁ  ts for the sick and disabled increased from just over €7.2 billion in 
1979 to €34 billion in 1996/1997, making it one of the fastest growing areas of British social security 
(Powell, 1999: 158). After the fundamental reform of IB in 1994, questions around disability beneﬁ  ts 
revolved around how to provide work for those recipients that can work, and livelihood for those 
who cannot (DSS, 1998). Consequently, from 1997 onwards, a shift towards encouraging claimants 
‘back to work’ took place. Furthermore, the requirements for entitlement were tightened and more 
closely linked to past labour market activity and medical testing. In 1999, the medical test for incapac-
ity for work was made stricter again (WRPA 30/1999). The All Work Test was renamed as Personal 
Capability Assessment. At one level, this was only a semantic change, since the criteria for assessing Page ● 18
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incapacity under the new test were identical to those under the former All Work Test. At another lev-
el, however, the change reﬂ  ected the Labour government’s concern that the former test only focused 
on what people cannot, rather than can, do (DSS, 1998). Rather than assessing claimants’ physical and 
mental limitations for beneﬁ  t purposes, the Personal Capability Assessment was virtually designed to 
capture claimants’ capabilities and to assist them in getting back to work. Furthermore, as of April 
2001, IB recipients were required to attend the Work Focused Interview (WFI) as an integral part of 
their claim for beneﬁ  t. That the interviews were work-focused meant that disabled claimants must 
co-operate with the Beneﬁ  t Agency by attending the meeting at the speciﬁ  ed time and place, and they 
had to provide any information requested (including the claimants’ educational qualiﬁ  cations, skills, 
training, work experience, and any barriers to work such as child care or ill health). Failure to provide 
such information meant that the claim was not completed, and beneﬁ  ts could be refused. Participa-
tion in reintegration measures (training, work experience and so forth) under the ND programmes 
remained voluntary for the disabled. In October 2008, the Incapacity Beneﬁ  t was replaced by an 
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), which similar to the Dutch disability beneﬁ  t (WIA) 
discussed below, distinguishes between disabled people able and unable to work. The group of fully 
disabled met rather few changes and they remained to be covered by a more modest basic insurance 
provision. The group of partially disabled, however, faces now much stringent activation require-
ments under the new ‘in-work’ beneﬁ  t scheme (e.g., more work-related Personal Capability Assess-
ment and the new work-focused health related assessment).
Although rather radical reforms have been implemented to the British disability schemes, the 
case shows an example for change within the limits of path dependence: through changes in social 
protection rights, the British social protection programmes for fully disabled have rediscovered ‘the 
Beveridgean’ idea of minimum provision. In addition to this, however, new elements have been in-
cluded in to the Beveridgean institution, such as a more active layer (cf. Streeck and Thelen, 2005b 
discussed below) of activation policies and more stringent medical examination. Most clearly, this has 
become evident for the partially disabled in the UK.3 Page ● 19
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The Netherlands  3.2. 
The roots of the Dutch system also lie in the famous British Beveridge Report (1942). While 
in exile in London during the WW II, the Dutch government formed a committee in 1943 to make 
a plan for social insurance after the war. The report of the Van Rhijn committee (Sociale Zeker-
heid, 1945) was considered as a blueprint for the Dutch social security system (Pennings, 1990 ). It 
sketched a system of comprehensive workers’ insurances, but unlike the Beveridgean system, it paid 
beneﬁ  ts at the level of previous wages (80 % of the past wages). Furthermore, the Van Rhijn Com-
mittee emphasised that workers insurance programmes should be compensated with a number of 
national (people’s) insurances providing beneﬁ  ts at a uniform subsistence level for all residents. By 
the late 1970s, the provision of disability beneﬁ  ts indeed was generated through workers earnings-
related disability insurances (Act WAO of 1967) and state basic disability insurance schemes (Act 
AAW of 1975) covering all disabled residents including self-employed and persons outside of the 
labour market. However, when the ﬁ  rst effects of the oil crises and stagnating economic growth be-
came visible, expansion of the Dutch came to a rapid end. Reforms to come (summarised in Table 2 
below) manifest the preservation of the insurance principle, yet there is a clear shift from provision 
of (Beveridgean) national insurances to worker’s (Bismarckian) insurances.4
  Act, Stb. 1986, 561 Abolition of the provision describing compensation for the reduced labour
TBA Stb. 1993, 412 WAO divided into an age-related beneﬁ  t and a follow up beneﬁ  t
Abolition of AAW, introduction of WAJONG (Stb. 1997, 177) and WAZ (Stb. 1997, 176)
WIA, Stb. 2005, 572 disability beneﬁ  ts IVA and WGA introduced
Table 2. A synthesis of principle-changing reforms in the Netherlands, 1980-2006
The number of people depending on income transfers from all programmes had doubled be-
tween 1970 and 1985 from 1.6 million to 3.2 million (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997: 128). The ﬁ  rst 
reaction to the crises in the 1980s was to cut rising social expenditure. To cure this ‘Dutch disease’ 
(Aarts et al., 1996) of high unemployment and moderate economic performance all welfare ‘non-
sense’ had to stop, as the Prime Minister Lubbers (of the Christian-Liberal coalition 1982-1986) put Page ● 20
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it (see more, e.g., Becker, 1999). The initial reforms of the 1980s aimed at lowering beneﬁ  t levels, i.e. 
by freezing the indexation between 1982 and 1985, cutting the beneﬁ  ts twice by almost three per cent 
in 1984, and lowering the beneﬁ  t percentages from 80 to 70 per cent of previous wage (in 1984). 
Additionally, an old anomaly within the disability beneﬁ  t provision was removed. Since 1972, it had 
been paradoxically possible to receive full beneﬁ  ts even if claimant was only partially incapacitated.5 
Due to these generous rules, it was not surprising that the WAO programme was frequently used in 
the 1970s and 1980s for easing the effects of mass redundancies and restructuring of the economy 
(Klosse, 1989). This was, however, an expensive way to restructure the labour market and had led to 
a considerable growth in numbers of people claiming disability beneﬁ  ts. To remove this anomaly, the 
level of WAO beneﬁ  t was strictly linked to the extent of disability and partially disabled workers with 
reduced labour market prospects could only be granted partial disability beneﬁ  ts in 1987 (Stb. 1986, 
561). At the same time, most claimants on beneﬁ  t faced a medical re-assessment round.
Regardless of the ‘price policies’ of the 1980s, the number of unemployed skyrocketed from 
65,000 in 1980 to more than 410,000 claimants in 1994, and the number of people receiving disability 
beneﬁ  t approached almost one million in the early 1990s (UWV, 2005: 12, Table 2.1). To meet these 
problems, political measures in the 1990s culminated in the ‘volume policy’, which ﬁ  rst and foremost 
declared the need to reduce the number of (disabled) people on beneﬁ  ts (TK, 1990/1991). Not-
withstanding major political and societal discontent, the cabinet’s reform with respect to disability 
programmes (known as the T-Laws as elaborated below) entered into force in the ﬁ  rst half of 1990s.6 
The reforms tightened the conditions (with regards to access, duration, rate, and activation) around 
the receipt of WAO. The ﬁ  rst law, the Act on Reducing the Disability Volume (TVA), imposed more 
obligations on employers to generate suitable work for their sick employees, if such was available 
in the company (Stb. 1992, 82 ). The second T-reform, the Act on Reducing Disability Claims, the 
TBA, structurally revised the WAO programme in 1993 (Stb. 1993, 412). It re-modiﬁ  ed the beneﬁ  t 
structure by distinguishing a basic (wage-related) beneﬁ  t and a follow up beneﬁ  t (paid at a minimum 
rate). The change put an end to a disability provision of Bismarckian earnings-related insurance ben-
eﬁ  ts until retirement age (this was, however, abolished in 2004, as discussed below). The basic WAO 
remained a wage-related beneﬁ  t (70 % of the previous daily wage) as earlier, but its duration was re-
lated to the claimants’ age at the time of establishing the right. The TBA also tightened the disability Page ● 21
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criteria considerably: the insured were assessed on the basis of the new deﬁ  nition irrespective of their 
previous education or work experience. The TBA introduced a new re-assessment for WAO beneﬁ  t 
recipients, only six years after the previous re-assessment. The re-assessment led to 47 per cent of 
beneﬁ  ciaries having their beneﬁ  ts either reduced or withdrawn (Pennings, 2002: 13). 
Crucially also, the state disability beneﬁ  t programme was abolished in 1997. The AAW had been a 
particularly vital beneﬁ  t for those long-term incapacitated who did not qualify for the workers’ WAO, 
such as the self-employed, students and people who had become disabled at a very early age or were 
so from birth. Yet, the consequences of the withdrawal of the AAW were alleviated by incorporating 
some of its redistributive tasks into two new disability beneﬁ  t programmes: the Incapacity Insurance 
for Self-employed Persons Act (WAZ, Stb. 1997, 176) and the Incapacity Provision for Young Disa-
bled Persons Act (WAJONG, Stb. 1997, 177) of 1997. Although universal disability insurance was no 
longer available, the majority of the old AAW recipients (232,000 in 1997) belonged to the group of 
self-employed (48,000), or young disabled (107,000) (SZW, 1999: 152, Table 11A). For them very little 
changed since they were covered by the new targeted programmes (although the WAZ was abolished 
in 2004).7 However, the change caused a notable shift from (a more comprehensive) Beveridgean 
provision to purely workers’ provision (nota bene Bismarckian scheme) for the Dutch disabled.
After a slight decrease in the numbers of WAO recipients in the early 1990s, the number of WAO 
beneﬁ  ciaries rose again from 697,000 in 1996 to 803,000 in 2002 (UWV 2005: 14, Table 2.1). As a 
response, the employers’ responsibility for sick pay was extended to 104 weeks as of 2003 (Stb. 2001, 
567). The change not only increased the responsibilities of employers with respect to their employ-
ees, but it fundamentally altered the maximum duration of the short-term sickness payment of 52 
weeks existing since 1930. The beneﬁ  t levels remained the same (70 per cent) for the ﬁ  rst year, which 
were commonly topped up to 100 per cent according to collective agreements. The government put 
pressure on the social partners not to supplement the 70 per cent in the second year. The extension 
of the sickness beneﬁ  t for another year had favourable consequences, as the level of sick pay was 
often higher than the equivalent WAO beneﬁ  t. This alteration was, however, supported by the Law 
on improving the Gatekeeper (the WVP, Stb. 2001, 628) requiring employers to produce a reintegra-
tion report and to co-operate with the employee. Moreover, fundamental reform was enacted in Page ● 22
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2005 when the WAO was closed for new claimants as of January 1st 2006 and a new Act on Work 
and Income according to work capacity (WIA) took over the insurance of long-term disability (Stb. 
2005, 619). The WIA distinguishes clearly between permanent disability beneﬁ  t (IVA for people with 
at least 80 % loss of income) and compensation for the partially disabled (WGA for people with a 
disability between 35 and 80 %loss of income). The IVA is, however, a more generous beneﬁ  t than 
the former (full) WAO: it gives an incapacitated worker with little or no chance of recovery a beneﬁ  t 
amounting to 75 per cent of the last earned salary, which remains payable at that level providing the 
recipient satisﬁ  es the re-assessments, until pensionable age (unlike WAO that paid 70% for a certain 
age-related period). WGA integrates disability beneﬁ  t and unemployment beneﬁ  t for the disabled and 
this is reﬂ  ected in the beneﬁ  t rules. For instance, to be eligible for the WGA the partially disabled are 
obliged to seek and accept suitable work, just as under the unemployment insurance (WW). The level 
of earnings-related WGA equals to 70 per cent of the difference between the daily wage (a maximum 
€43,770 per year applies) and the wage that the partially disabled person earns from employment and 
is paid for between three and 38 months, after which the WGA makes a division between partially 
disabled who work and those who do not work. Persons having no income or an income for work 
amounting to less than 50 percent of their remaining earnings-capacity, have a right to a follow-up 
beneﬁ  t of 70 per cent of the minimum wage multiplied by their disability percentage. Persons work-
ing (and using more than 50 per cent of their earnings-capacity), get a supplement up to 70 per cent 
of the difference between last earned salary and the wage earned now. This beneﬁ  t can also not be 
supplemented with any other beneﬁ  t.
To sum up, although being less comprehensive, the insurance principle has been preserved in 
Dutch social security programmes, at least for the social security programmes for the unemployed 
and people with a full disability. The Beveridgean insurance programmes have been eroded and it has 
had to give way to Bismarckian insurance elements combined with targeted disability beneﬁ  ts for the 
young. Page ● 23
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Finland 3.3. 
Unlike the UK and the Netherlands, the creation of the Finnish welfare state was less strongly 
inﬂ  uenced by the Beveridge Report (Niemelä and Salminen, 2002: 58). Whereas the Beveridge report 
proposed social security for all, the Finnish government saw it as more important to provide a piece 
of land to everybody. Due to scarce ﬁ  nancial resources and political difﬁ  culties, the development of 
social security remained mainly at the level of rhetoric and it was not until the liberation of foreign 
trade in 1955 that a rapid modernization process started.8 During this time of economic growth and 
prosperity many of the plans were embedded into concrete social policy innovations: the National 
Pension Act (347/1956) guaranteeing an universal pension was implemented, followed by welfare 
programmes for sickness, unemployment and a comprehensive basis of the national social security 
systems was gradually created.9 By the beginning of 1980 the Finnish welfare state had reached the 
other Nordic countries in its comprehensiveness (Stephens, 1996, Alestalo, 2000, Anttonen and Sip-
ilä, 2000). At this stage, the Finnish programmes generated rather low beneﬁ  ts both for workers but 
also for residents (through universal beneﬁ  ts), but during the expansion of provision in the 1980s, 
this was improved.
The oil crisis in the 1970s did not affect Finland as severely as it did many other European coun-
tries: on the contrary, unemployment was under four per cent by the end of the 1970s, which was his-
torically very low. The favourable economic circumstances enabled the expansion of social security 
arrangements throughout the 1980s: the rates were increased and early-retirement schemes (for disa-
bled) were introduced. For instance, Individual Early Retirement Pension programme (yksilöllinen 
varhaiseläke) was enacted in 1985 that provided beneﬁ  ts for wage workers or the self-employed aged 
55-64 whose work capability had diminished, due to illness or disability. Under the term of Prime 
Minister Koivisto (Social Democratic party 1979-1982), the coverage of state (disability) pension was 
expanded by abolishing the means-test from (supplementary part of) the pension, which made the 
national old age pension system ﬁ  nally universal, guaranteeing basis security for all (elderly) citizens.Page ● 24
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Act 103/1982 Means-test abolished from supplementary part of the disability pension
Act 619/1991 Rehabilitative possibilities must be deﬁ  ned prior to receipt of disability pension 
(new beneﬁ  ts provided for this period)
Act 1491/1995 National pensions (gradually) tested for other pension income 1995-2000 
Table 3. A synthesis of principle-changing reforms in Finland, 1980-2006
In the 1990s, the expansion of the Finnish social security provision came to abrupt end. Unem-
ployment increased rapidly: in only one year the number of Basic Unemployment Beneﬁ  t beneﬁ  -
ciaries more than doubled from 50,827 in 1990 to 126,642 by the end of 1991 (KELA, 1992: 191, 
Table 110). This led to a series of reforms: beneﬁ  t rates were cut (particularly through suspending 
the annual indexation) and the access (of the young unemployed in particular) to beneﬁ  t schemes 
was hampered. Importantly, only 12 years after the previous revision of the Finnish national pension, 
the reform that Kangas (1994) claimed brought Finland into the group of Nordic welfare states, the 
national pension programme was fundamentally reformed. In the 1995 Pension Act (1491/1995), 
the base amount and the supplementary part were united into one pension beneﬁ  t and the new na-
tional pension was tested against any pension income from legislated (public) pension programmes. 
The national pension was now granted only if the claimant had little or no other pension income. 
This was expected to reduce the number of national pension claimants, not only in the case of old 
age pensions, but also for disability pensions, given the increasing coverage and entitlements of em-
ployment pensions. In principle this was a radical reform. Even though the universal beneﬁ  ts were 
replaced with ‘means tested’ ones, national pensions still guarantee a minimum livelihood for Finnish 
residents.10 Accordingly, however, the universalist element of the Finnish programmes was eroded by 
reforms making rules for citizenship-based rights (in national pensions and national insurance ben-
eﬁ  ts for the ill and unemployed) give way to employment-based workers programmes. 
Eligibility was also changed by replacing the former temporary Disability Pension (paid in the 
case of temporary and partial work incapacity) with a Rehabilitation Subsidy (Kuntoutustuki based 
on 1487/1995 Laki Kansaneläkelain Muuttamisesta). The Rehabilitation Subsidy aimed at supporting 
the temporarily disabled to continue working. Eligibility was made conditional on producing a care Page ● 25
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and rehabilitation plan and after the expiration of the period of rehabilitation the recipients were 
either guided to the Disability Pension programme or had to return to work. The young, in particular, 
faced stricter reintegration measures. Those aged between 16 and 18 (extended to 20 in 2002) were 
required in all cases to claim a new Rehabilitation Allowance. Yet, encouragement to work was not 
only directed at the temporarily disabled; the permanently disabled also faced their share of work-re-
lated obligations in 1995. Prior to granting disability pension, the rehabilitative potential of all claim-
ants (on sickness beneﬁ  t at the time) had to be deﬁ  ned. To receive a Disability Pension, claimants 
were required, in conjunction with the beneﬁ  t administration, to submit a care and rehabilitation plan 
to the social insurance institute. From 1995, more emphasis was placed on remaining work capability 
rather than incapability (Nikkarinen et al., 1998, Hytti et al., 2006). This made it harder to be assessed 
as incapacitated for work and, subsequently, to receive the disability pension. Notably the number of 
claimants on Disability Pension decreased quite steeply (from 212.359 in 1996 to 136,522 in 2004) 
(KELA, 2004: 98, Table 26). Recently ﬁ  gures have shown that half of the new claims (50.8 per cent 
in 2006) are channelled to Rehabilitation subsidy programmes (Hytti et al., 2006: 18, Table 4). Finally, 
since the 1990s, reforms have been aimed at prevention of early retirement, through, for example the 
tightening of the rules for Individual Early Retirement pension programmes
To sum up, reforms have diluted the universalism principle and increased the importance of 
Bismarckian insurance programmes in Finnish social security provision. However, one must consider 
that the basic security programmes still exists (in unemployment, sickness and disability beneﬁ  t provi-
sion), which makes the Finnish system still somewhat more comprehensive (universal) in comparison 
with the Dutch and British insurance programmes, where such programmes have been abolished 
during the last 26 years. However, the fact that universalism has not been abandoned, indicates that 
reform in Finland is path dependent and the preference for basic provision is still at the core of social 
policy making. This is also clear in the suggestions made by the recent SATA committee founded in 
2008 to determine the future of the Finnish social security. We can see from the Finnish example 
that, even though attempts have been made to change the status and the structure of the beneﬁ  t 
programmes, the logic of universalism has not withered away. Rather the logic of universalism (or 
at least a wider coverage of programmes) continues to exist, but now it is complemented with other 
(new or latent) elements. Page ● 26
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Findings 4. 
The picture that arises from our ﬁ  ndings is that of path dependent change. Countries follow the 
trajectories of underlying redistribution principles and legacies. The UK programmes have been re-
turned, after two decades of attempting to increased elements of a Bismarckian system, to providing 
a minimum provision for those in need, Dutch programmes continue to protect workers against loss 
of income, although a much smaller group of workers can enter the programme than before, and 
the Finnish system, although less universal than in the 1980s, still provides a wider basic security for 
Finnish residents, but at the same time it today emphasises more protection of workers (earnings-
related) programmes. These (targeted minimum provision, workers insurance, and basic provision) 
are the three dominant path-dependent structures emerging from our data and they follow the three 
social security principles. However, it becomes evident from the data that path-dependence does not 
mean frozenness or resilience to change. The ﬁ  ndings show how within path dependent change new 
elements can evolve; old structures can have new meanings; and additional, complementary elements 
can be created next to the traditional institutions. For instance, the British case illustrated a case of 
what Streeck and Thelen (2005: 21-22) call as institutional displacement: the rediscovery or activation 
of previously suppressed or suspended possibilities took place in the UK, when the clock was turned 
back in time of ‘Beveridgean’ minimum provision. Also the structural changes under the WIA for 
the partially disabled are perhaps something that illustrates the institutional conversion (Streeck and 
Thelen 2005: 26-29), where old institutions are re-employed to new purposes. Rather than aiming at 
earnings-replacement for the partially disabled as under the former WAO beneﬁ  t, the new disability 
beneﬁ  t for partially disabled (WGA under WIA) aims more at encouraging people to work and could 
therefore be seen more as an ‘in-work-beneﬁ  t’ rather than an insurance beneﬁ  t in the traditional 
sense. In addition to (path dependent) reforms, evidence for implementing a new layer of increased 
activation and conditionality to supplement the traditional institutions was found. This conditional 
activation element is also something we can ﬁ  nd back in Streeck and Thelen’s (2005: 18-20) concep-
tualisation for layering, where new elements are attached to existing institutions that may gradually 
change their status and structure. Indeed, to improve the supply of labour and bring people out-of-
work back to the labour market, the reform of social policy in Europe has increasingly centred on 
preference of work above beneﬁ  t. This shift from passive to active social policy can be found in the Page ● 28
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most welfare states in Europe, yet these reforms have commonly been implemented with the national 
policy instruments and take place in the national framework of policies (see also van Gerven, 2009). 
This is a simple account of how path dependent development trajectories interact with exogenously 
changing environments. 
What becomes evident from this all, is the importance of a long time period in the analyses of 
beneﬁ  t reform and welfare state change. In order to capture path dependence empirically, a long time 
frame is needed to deal with a long phasing-in periods of the policy decisions (from decisions to ac-
tual implementation of the policies) and staged reforms in an (often) incremental process over time 
(see also Bonoli and Palier, 2007). In the British case, it becomes clear how a period of several dec-
ades of continuous reform was needed to understand the reform outcomes. Simply viewing changes 
for one or two decades can lead to an inaccurate interpretation of changes. Page ● 29
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Conclusion 5. 
To consolidate the claims of path dependent, yet not pre-determined change of welfare institu-
tions, this article presents evidence from an in-depth analysis of changes in the rights and conditions 
of disability insurance beneﬁ  t programmes in three countries (the UK, the Netherlands, and Finland) 
over an extensive period of more than 26 years. It is claimed here that path dependence in social 
policy should be interpreted as an indication of certain solutions being more likely to be taken in the 
reform of policies, not that social policy institutions are unmovable or resilient against reform. Path 
dependence should not be regarded as a prediction of policy-makers being unable to alter the system, 
rather it merely delimits the number of options available for the policy makers. For any reasons (for 
example those related to the blame-avoiding nature of politicians or the bureaucratic nature of social 
policy-making) social policy makers are rarely in a situation where they can ignore the past. Rather, 
their decisions are bound by the past and the present. Path dependence, in our view, serves explicitly 
as an explanation why certain solutions are more likely to be taken. 
In this article, the developments in social security provision were analysed with respect to a single 
contingency (disability). Similar ﬁ  ndings were, however, found in an analysis including a wider range 
of social security programmes (i.e. sickness, disability, unemployment insurances and social assistance 
schemes in these three European countries (van Gerven 2008). Inevitably, future research must in-
clude a larger number of countries and view the developments from a wider perspective (i.e. include 
developments in pensions, service provision ) in order to test the hypothesis made in this article and 
to have a more comprehensive view on changes. This article has, however, tried to contribute em-
pirically to the modest pool of literature tracing the trajectories of change over a extensive period 
of time and across different European welfare states. Furthermore, an attempt has been made to 
improve the theoretical understanding of one of the main (but often vaguely deﬁ  ned) concepts of 
welfare state change research.Page ● 30
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Endnotes
1  For the insurance principle, authors commonly make a distinction between Bismarckian and Beveridgean
  insurance, where the former refers to insurances with a tight link between contributions and beneﬁ  t, and 
  the latter to insurances with ﬂ  at rate beneﬁ  ts and contributions which are propertied to earnings.
2  Below, only the reforms to the state scheme are discussed.
3  Unlike often claimed in the literature (examples), i found very little direct evidence for increased means-
  testing in the UK. As only reform of its kind, an introduction of a means-test (of occupational pension 
  income) to disability insurance programmes in 1999. However, as the means-test applied only to a limited 
  number of claimants (those with occupational pension income above a certain amount). Also this reform, 
  can de interpreted as step towards a preference towards less stronger public minimum provision. We 
  did, however, found evidence for the enhanced means-testing through creeping cumulative legislative 
  changes (through cuts in duration and rates of insurance beneﬁ  t) and other changes (such as increasing 
  role of in-work (tax) beneﬁ  ts in the welfare provision) that have increased the importance of means-
  testing and the role of means-testing assistance in the provision of social security beneﬁ  t in the UK 
4  This result is however valid only for the programme investigated here, and we must note that there are
  still strong elements of national insurances available in the Netherlands (such as national old age pension, 
  widowers’ pensions etc.). 
5  The discrepancy was possible while, according to an administrative decision, in determining the remaining 
  earnings capacity it was considered whether claimants who, in theory, possessed a certain earnings capacity,
  would be able to realize this in the labour market. Should they be unable to do so as a result of their 
  disability, the theoretically determined remaining earnings capacity would be lowered and the degree of 
  incapacity to work was assessed at a higher.
6  The law proposed in the early 1990s faced strong criticism. On 17 September 1991, nearly a million people 
  demonstrated against the reform in what was probably the largest protest demonstration in Dutch history 
  (Hemerijck; Manow and van Kersbergen 2000).
7  According to the statistics (SZW 1999: 152, Table 11A) 3,000 recipients in 1997 belonged to the category 
  of ‘other claimants’, including students and other disabled not qualifying for the workers’ WAO. They (in 
  many case housewives) were excluded from the disability programmes, and had to seek income compensation 
  from time-limited unemployment beneﬁ  t, means-tested social assistance, or other such programmes.Page ● 32
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8  The slow start of social reform had to do with a difﬁ  cult past, but was also due to the fact that on the 
  top of the post-war political agenda were the paybacks of the war indemnity to Russia, help for widows 
  and orphans, and different housing projects for those returning from the war.
9 The  ﬂ  at-rate universal National Pension (with an universal basic amount and a means-tested additional 
  amount) was later in the 1960s supplemented with other (means-tested components).
10  The majority of the working population is in practise ineligible for the (full) national pension due to their 
  income from occupation pension. Yet, in the case of Disability pensions, claimants commonly do not 
  have a sufﬁ  cient work history to be granted employment pensions and therefore the reform has not been 
  successful in channelling people to employment pensions, rather most claimants end up claiming national 
  pensions. This is indicated in studies (for instance, Hytti; Ylöstalo and Ruhanen 2006) which show that 
  the role of national pensions has become more important in the provision of disability beneﬁ  ts.Page ● 33
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